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The March on Delhi

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threats. Details are given on the strategic and tactical forces, the various services, supporting programs of logistics and research and development, and the manner in which this impressive military potential is geared to fighting wars from the guerrilla level to a general nuclear conflict. The author has placed United States military strength in context with national policy and other forms of national power, and has assessed the interdependence of economic and technological factors as well. The section on national purpose, interests, principles, objectives, policies, and commitments will be particularly valuable to students. The book is decidedly a valuable one to grace the library of every professional, civilian, or military individual, working for, close to, or with, the Department of Defense. With Colonel Powers' book, any interested citizen can learn to appreciate our massive defense effort and understand where one-half of the national budget goes. Further, the book will make a fine addition to the junior and senior ROTC libraries at educational institutions. An interesting feature of this book is that it was written by a student in the Naval War College, Class of 1965. Although he wrote the book prior to his assignment at the College, it was published during his student tenure.

A.B. SMITH
Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Barker, A.J. *The March on Delhi*. London: Faber and Faber, 1963. 302 p.

Britain had been at war five years, the United States three. In 1944, the Allied success of the Normandy landings held the attention of the world. But what of operations in other theaters? Lieutenant Colonel Barker, in his very credible book, has recreated the agonies, successes, and failures in one—the India-Burma-China Theater. In 1944, the Japanese envisioned Burma to be the eastern passage to India, and the Plains of Imphal to be the gateway to Delhi. The rigor and stench of jungle warfare at its worst and the incredible problems of movement, logistics, and survival in the monsoon-soaked forests are vividly described as the action unfolds. The names of Stilwell, Mountbatten, Scoones, Chennault, Wingate, Cochran, Mutaguchi, Sato, Yamauchi, and others, figure prominently in the strategy and tactics centering upon the Imphal Plains in northern Burma. Imphal is counted by the author as being one of the decisive battles of World War II. The war in the Far East might have

taken an entirely different course had the Japanese succeeded in their assault on Imphal and their drive for Delhi. They almost did.

C.D. CORN
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Etzioni, Amitai. *Winning Without War*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. 271 p.

Professor Etzioni, a sociologist and member of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, points to a new strategy designed 'to advance freedom more and risk survival less' than the policies of containment and bipolar status quo pursued by the United States since 1947. He argues eloquently that the prerequisites of the 'strategy of duopoly' are rapidly disappearing and that both the 'protractionists' (believing in the impossibility of conflict resolution, hence protracted conflict or status quo) and the 'resolutionists' (who would work for resolution in spite of poor chances and high cost) theorize within the same outdated frame of reference. His own alternative, 'competition under rules,' while building upon the emerging novel elements of international reality, is said to offer more than a risky stalemate and to be less difficult to attain than a complete resolution. 'Competition under rules' would confine military deterrence to the two major powers—and that only temporarily, while they continue to work toward a meaningful system of arms reduction. The opportunity offered by the rise of third-force countries would be utilized to reduce the risk of escalation by freeing them from pressure to join one or the other camp and substituting a system of 'remote deterrence' (perhaps on the Austrian model) for the threats of military intervention. But military disengagement is only one side of the picture. Global trade and aid to underdeveloped countries would remain among the outlets for the pent-up energy of the major powers, requiring that the U.S.S.R. be admitted to the international monetary system and included in the negotiations for tariff and quota reductions (and that China be admitted to the United Nations) to assure 'peaceful engagement' of both major camps. Accordingly, a 'redistribution of efforts and resources' among the instruments of foreign policy, already initiated under the Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations, would have to be pursued further. Etzioni suggests a variety of gradual steps, based at first on the mutual interest in nonannihilation, to lead toward community-building activities, eventually under the auspices of strengthened international organizations of both regional and global varieties.